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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH f 
DONNA LEE, a Minor, by and 
through her Guardian ad Litem, 
LOFTIN LEE, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
JEANNE W. HOWES, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 14128 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff/Appellant, Donna Lee, by 
and through her Guardian ad Litem, Loftin Lee, against the Defendant/ 
Respondent, Jeanne W. Howes, to recover damages for personal injuries 
she sustained as a result of a motor vehicle-pedestrian collision which 
occurred on November 5, 1973. 
The parties will be referred to herein as they appear in the 
lower court. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The trial of the case was held in the District Court of Salt 
Lake County on the 26th and 27th days of March, 1975 before the Honorable 
James S. Sawaya with a jury. The case was submitted to the jury on 
special verdict, and on March 27, 1975 the special verdict was returned 
by the jury in which six jurors found that the defendant was not negli-
gent, with two dissenting, and all the jurors ruled that the plaintiff 
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was negligent and that her negligence caused her injuries. The court 
entered its judgment on the verdict in favor of the defendant and 
against the plaintiff, no cause of action. The plaintiff made a timely 
motion for a new trial on two grounds: (1) Insufficiency of the 
evidence to justify the verdict, and (2) error in law. On May 6, 1975 
the court entered its order denying plaintiff's motion for new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks to have the judgment of the lower court and 
order denying the motion for new trial reversed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Inasmuch as this appeal is largely predicated upon the pro-
position that the evidence was insufficient to justify the jury's 
special verdict, the plaintiff will summarize all of the pertinent 
evidence relating thereto for the convenience of the court. 
Plaintiff Donna Lee testified that she was 14 years of age. 
(R. 153) That she lived three houses from the corner of Mantle Avenue 
and 2200 West on the east side of the street, (R. 155) That she 
washed the face of a boy named Brian who had been throwing a snowball 
at her, and left him lying on the ground about 25 feet from the corner, 
that she turned and observed that he was not going to come after her. 
She stepped off the curb, remembered looking both ways and could not 
see anything. (R. 157) There was a street light right above the 
crosswalk which fairly well illuminated the area, but she still 
could not see anything. She remembered seeing the white line of the 
crosswalk from her left eye and of proceeding a foot or two, but could 
not remember anything else from there. (T. 20) She might have been 
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running when she left Brian in the snow, but she knew that he was not 
chasing her as he was still on the ground. (R. 193) She looked to 
the left and did not see anything, and she looked to the right and did 
not see anything. (R. 195) She did not remember ever seeing the 
defendant's vehicle, and does not know where it hit her, nor where she 
was when she was hit. (R. 197) 
Deputy Sheriff Holger V. Jensen testified that he arrived at 
the scene of the accident after the pedestrian had been taken into the 
house. (R. 207) He could not find any skid marks or any blood to 
determine initial contact. Two hours later he established contact with 
the defendant and her husband at the Valley Fair Mall station. (R. 208) 
He identified the defendant and her husband in the courtroom. The first 
thing he asked Mrs. Howes was why she left the scene, and she said she 
was on her way home from work at the Valley Fair Mall, got nervous and 
really did not know what to do, so she wcmt home to talk to her husband. 
She said she did not see the victim until she hit her. She indicated 
she was going around 40 miles per hour. (R. 210) The officer noted 
this on his accident report and independently recalled her stating 
that her speed was around 40 miles per hour. She said nothing about 
being worried because of the agitation at: the scene of the accident 
for her own safety. The posted speed limit at the scene of the accident 
was 30 miles per hour, a residential area. (R. 211) He observed 
damage to the right side of the hood, headlight and grill. (R. 218) 
Larry Lee testified that he was the brother of the plaintiff 
and was in the living room of house #4255 watching TV when Marilyn 
knocked on the door and told him that Donna was hit. He ran across 
the street to house #4246 and called the ambulance and the police, and 
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went outside to see how she was. She; was lying by the mailbox on the 
grass, completely off the side of the: road. She was mumbling and not 
making any sense, talking out of her head. She did not know what was 
going on. (R. 221^ 222) He noticed a little car sitting up the street 
and started walking toward it. It was about 40 feet from where Donna 
was lying. He knew it was a light color. (R. 223) The girl walked 
toward him and turned around and then somebody else got out of the car. 
They switched drivers, she getting into the passengers side and the 
other person got into the drivers side. When he first saw the girl 
there were no taillights burning, but: they turned on their lights after 
proceeding past a couple of houses. (R. 224, 225) 
Billy Lee testified that he was 15 years of age and a cousin 
of the plaintiff. He lived in house #4246. (R. 231) He first became 
aware of the accident when Marilyn came into the house and said that 
Donna was hit. He saw Donna lying by the bushes by the mailbox. She 
was mumbling and did not know what she was saying. (R. 232) He 
observed a light colored small car with its lights out on the side of 
the road. (R. 233) 
Julie Lee, cousin of the plaintiff, testified that she was 12 
years old. (R. 234) She was on the corner where the crosswalk starts 
when the accident occurred, watching the "goofing" around. She saw 
Donna wash Brian's face. (R. 235) Brian was sitting on the ground 
brushing the snow off his face and was not mad or anything. He no 
longer lives in this vicinity. As Donna started to leave she started 
to walk after her about two feet behind her. She looked at plaintiff 
and the car was coming. (R. 236) Plaintiff started to cross the inter-
section in the pedestrian lane. "As I was looking at her she was 
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running across the street. I wasn't going to run. I was looking first 
and then Donna looked and then she was running and I seen the car come and 
then I seen her hit the roof and then she flew off." She said that the 
car she saw coming did not have lights on. After Donna was hit she 
flew and then all of them ran over to where she was. (R. 237) She 
came to rest about where the mailbox is. She appeared to leave the 
pedestrian lane after the center of the street and got out of the ped-
estrian lane about one or two feet when she was struck. After she ran 
over to the plaintiff, she saw a car facing south about three houses 
down from her house. (R. 238, 259) She saw Larry and Billy walking 
over and then the car left. (R. 240) Tie plaintiff was running faster 
than the witness. The witness looked to the left and did not see any-
thing. No cars passed from the left. She looked to the right and saw 
the car. Donna was already in the middle. (R. 247) When Julie looked 
at the car it did not have its lights on (R. 248) Julie testified 
that the plaintiff did not immediately fly off the car when she was 
hit. "It seemed like she was carried and then she had flewfen up."--
Carried her maybe about a half a foot or so and then she flew off the 
car. She was only a foot or two off the crosswalk when she was struck. 
(R. 249) The car that she observed strike Donna was the same car that 
she later saw stopped up the road. (R. 250) 
Wanda Jensen, grandmother of the plaintiff who took care of her 
immediately following the accident, testified that she was very dis-
oriented and could not remember anything. (R. 270) 
William Y. Tipton, engineer, testified about the preparation of 
the map with a scale of one inch representing ten feet. (R. 275) 
The defendant testified that she worked at Z.C.M0I. at the 
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Valley Fair Mall and was driving a Toyota automobile. (R. 290) She 
had driven along 2200 West street on this same route every day for 
three years. (R. 291) She left work at about 6:20. It was dark so 
she could not see without her headlights and had them on. (R. 292) 
She knows that she was going 25 miles per hour. 
ffQ. And you have heard testimony in court that the officer 
claims you told him you were going forty, is that true? 
nA. I don't remember telling him that.11 
She looked at her speedometer after she was through the inter-
section of Mantle Avenue and 2200 West. (R. 293) After she got through 
the intersection a car passed going north with really bright lights 
which affected her vision. It was right before the car passed that 
she checked her speed. She was right up in front of the white house 
(#4246) when the car passed. (R. 2S4) The car struck the plaintiff 
on the front end on the right side. When asked if the plaintiff stayed 
on the car or rolled off it, she said she just went over the edge. 
(R. 295) The defendant then pulled over and stopped as soon as she 
could, got out of the car, saw the girl lying by the hedge on the 
ground. (R. 296) 
"A. I got out of my car. I wanted to help. I wanted to see 
if there was anything I could do. 
"Q. All right. Did you go to help? 
,fA. No. I didn!t. 
"Q. What happened to change your mind? 
"A. I was really scared by the way that they were acting, you 
know, because they were scared and I was scared. 
flQ. Did anyone begin to approach you during this? 
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"A. Yes. 
"Q. And would you descri.be him? 
"A. They were -- it was dark. It was really dark and all I 
could see was a dark figure coming at me. 
"Q. All right. What did you do? 
f,A. I went to get my husband. 
HQ. And how did you do that? 
"A. I just got in my car and went to get him." (R. 297, 298) 
Defendant denied that anyone else was with her at the time. 
She drove home to get her husband where she explained to him what had 
happened and he called the police. (R. 299) On cross-examination she 
testified that she checked her speedometer right before the car passed 
her 
HQ. Well, now, I think I would like you to come down if you 
will and just mark on this map -•• now, understand this is ten feet to 
the inch. This is the crosswalk, This is the intersection. 
MI want you to mark on that map where you were when you last 
looked at your speedometer before the impact to see that you were 
going -- this one will be better -- to see that you were going twenty-
five miles per hour? 
c MA. About right here I would say. 
,fQ. Why don't you just put a cross there? 
,fA. Well, the car went by. 
ffQ. Did the car go by before you looked at your speedometer? 
flA. No. It was right before I looked and so it was about 
right here. 
ffQ. Now, let me get this straight: This car that came from 
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the south going north with its bright lights, did it pass you before 
you looked at your speedometer or after? 
,fA. Before. No, I looked at my -- I looked at the speedometer 
before the car passed. 
lfQ. All right. And you have put yourself about here? 
"A. Yes. 
,fQ. I am just going to put here 'Looked at speedometer.1 Is 
that correct? About here? 
ffA. Yeah." 
When asked how far this car with bright lights was when she 
first saw it coming, she said she can see a long ways down the road 
and she knew it was coming and she knew during all that period of time 
that it had bright* lights on. She could not say whether it was on high 
beam or low beam, the lights were just bright. (R. 302) 
f,Q. Well, did they blind you sufficiently that you couldn't 
see the road in front of you? 
nA. I wouldn't -- no, I wouldn't say that. 
"Q. Would they blind you sufficiently that you couldn't see 
objects ahead of you that you normally would be able to see? 
"A. No. 
"Q. As a matter of fact, they didn't blind you enough that you 
started to decrease your speed as a result of those bright lights did 
you? 
"A. Yes, I had already started to slow down. 
"Q. When did you start to slow down? 
"A. Well, from -- there is a light. There is another light 
up here and I wasn't going very fast along that road. I was trying to 
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keep it down. (R. 303) 
f!Q. Let me ask it one at a time. Did you attempt to reduce 
your speed at any time before you actually hit her? 
"A. Before I hit her? 
"Q. Uh-huh. 
,fA. I was just going down the road my normal speed. 
lfQ. Of twenty-five miles per hour? 
,fA. Yes. 
UQ. All right. Now, and you are still going that normal speed 
when you hit her? 
flA. Yes. 
ffQ. All right. So at no time prior to the time you hit her 
did you decrease your speed? 
"A. No. 
MQ. Even though the car was approaching you with bright lights 
that might have interfered with your view of the area? 
"A. Yes.,f (R. 305) 
With respect to the lookout she maintained, the defendant 
testified as follows: 
flQ. All right. Now, you say this girl came from your left 
immediately in front of you. Where was .she with respect to the center 
of 2200 West when you first saw her? 
,fA. She was just right in front of me. 
lfQ. All right. So she •-- you didn't see her at all until she 
had passed the center of the highway and was right in front of you? 
"A. Yes. 
ffQ. Had she -- when you first saw her had she passed your 
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left front? You hit her with your right front? Was she right directly 
in front of you when you first saw her? 
"A. YeS. - :.,.:,';,'.. r:;,,.:;::-.; 
ffQ. Or was she slightly to your left? 
lfA. She was right in front of me. 
lfQ„ So that you are saying is that you actually didn't see her 
at all until you hit her? 
ffA. Yes. 
flQ. How did you know she was running? 
ffA. Because I could tell. There was -- she was running be-
cause I could see her arms and her legs going. 
flQ. Well, I thought you said you didn't see her until you hit 
her. 
nA. Well, she was in motion when she -- when I hit her. (R. 306) 
l!Q. She didn't? Now, do you have any explanation for your not 
seeing this -- the plaintiff when she entered the street to come in 
front of you? 
"A. She was just right there. , i 
ffQ. Well, how do you think she got right there? 
flA. She must of ran. 
"Q. But in running to arrive at this point where -- you say 
she was struck right by this mailbox? 
"A. Yes. (R. 307) 
"Q. Right where she was lying after the accident? 
"A. Yes. 
nQ. And to get to this point which was on the extreme right-
hand side of your lane because you hit her with the right side of your 
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car did you not? 
"A. Yes. 
,fQ. To get to that point: she had to traverse the full width 
of this street which the engineer has measured at eighteen and a half 
feet to the center line and fourteen and two-tenths feet to this edge, 
she had to travel over thirty feet to get to the point where you hit 
her, is this correct? 
"A. Yes. 
HQ. How do you explain the fact that you did not see her 
whether she was walking or running or however she was going during the 
thirty feet that she was proceeding into the street ahead of you before 
you saw her? 
f,A. She was just there and I think she had dark clothes on. 
,fQ. Do you think she was: running faster than your car was 
moving? 
"A. I -- I really couldn't say. I don't know. (R. 308) 
,fQ. All right. After you stopped your car by this driveway 
you saw a group of children standing on the other side of the road in 
the vicinity of this house? 
lfA. Yes. 
,fQ. Which was about directly across from where the girl was 
lying off the side of the road? 
"A. Yes. 
nQ. And you saw these children run over to where she was 
lying? 
"A. Yes. 
ffQ. And that's when you -- and you saw one or two of them 
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coming in your direction? You didnft know who it was coming toward you? 
MA. Well, one of the girls ran back to the house to get another 
person. I am not sure who that was but that's the person that started 
walking up toward the car. 
"Q. At this time you didn't want him to know who you were or 
what you were doing? 
MA. No. I didn't mind if he knew who I was. I just thought 
that since there was all those people there I was frightened and I 
wanted my husband there." (R. 311) 
When asked directly if she told the officer about being blinded 
by lights of an approaching car, "I told him that there was a car that 
passed." (R. 312) 
In describing her actions to the officer after the accident, 
she testified further: 
"Q. Tell me what that conversation was. 
"A. I was really upset. I am not really sure what he said to 
us. 
girl? 
"Q. Well, I think you -- did you tell him that you struck the 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Did you tell him where you were when you struck her? 
"A. I don't think he asked me that. 
"Q. But you didn't tell him that? 
"A. I explained it. I mean, you know, I was telling him what 
had happened, yes. 
"Q. Did you tell him that this girl suddenly darted across the 
road in front of you? 
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"A. Yes, and he said that something -- that she was in the 
crosswalk and she said that -- or not she -- he said that someone told 
him that she was in the crosswalk and I said that she wasn't and he 
said that he agreed with me. He said that he didn't think she was either. 
"Q. And did you tell him how fast you were going at that time? 
"A. Yes, I did. 
lfQ. And what did you tell him about your speed? (R. 314) 
flA. I said twenty-five niles an hour. 
MQ. Did -- did you tell him how you knew that? Now, I am 
talking about the conversation you had with him in the presence of your 
husband in his car. 
"Ao Yes. 
f,Q. In the front of your apartment did you tell him when you 
looked at the speedometer to determine ycur speed? 
"A. I don't think he asked me that either and I -- I really 
can't remember. ^ . 
"Q. You don't remember telling him when you looked at your 
speed? 
"A. Yes, when I looked at the speedometer. 
"Q. Did you tell him that you looked at your speedometer at 
all at that time --
 ;} :.:..'.-, 
"A. I am — 
"Q. (Continuing) --to find out how fast you were going? 
"A. I can't remember if I told him or not. 
"Q. All right. Did you in the car at any time tell the 
officer that a car with bright lights had passed just before you 
struck the girl? 
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"A. Yes. Yes. 
ffQ. You are sure of this? 
MA. Yes. " :. - . v - . / , ••-...,:-...-
f,Q. You have a definite memory that in the car in front of 
your home in the presence of your husband you told him that? 
lfA. That a car had passed. 
MQ. With bright lights? 
f,A. With bright lights.11 (R. 315) 
When asked at what time with respect to the collision the car 
with the bright lights passed, she testified as follows: 
MA. It passed and then she was there. I am not -- it all 
happened so fast I am not really sure.. 
ffQ. You say she was there simultaneously? 
ffA. Yes. 
lfQ. In other words, the very moment that it passed she was 
there in front of your car and you couldn't see her arrive at that 
point? Is this correct? I don't want to put: any -- suggest any testi-
mony to you. I want you to tell me. I understand this car with bright 
lights you say affected your view of the highway but you hadn't at 
that point applied any brakes nor had you decreased your speed at that 
point when the lights affected your view, is this correct? 
"A. Right 
"Q. (By Mr. White) Whatever effect the approaching bright 
lights of this car had on you it was not sufficient to incline you to 
reduce your speed by reason of the bright lights, is this correct? 
ftA. Yes. 
"Q. This is correct? 
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"A. Yes. Yes. Yes. t> 
,fQ. And then this car passed with the bright lights and 
immediately right in front of your car was this girl, is this correct? 
"A. The car had gone past, yes. 
flQ. But immediately after it passed the girl was right in front 
of your car? * ^ 
"A. It's been so long ago but the car did pass and then I hit 
the girl.11 (R. 317, 318) ; ^ 
Marilyn McCandless, testifying for the defendant, stated that 
she was 16 years old and a friend of the plaintiff. (R. 320, 321) 
That after washing Brian's face in the snow, Donna ran across 
the street. (R. 323) The witness stopped at the gutter. She saw a 
car coming. (R. 324) 
She saw the car before Donna got hit. Marilyn testified that 
the plaintiff entered the crosswalk and remained in it until about the 
center of the street and then took an angle off to the other side. 
(R. 326) On further direct examination, the witness testified that 
she did not see the car at any time before it hit the plaintiff. She 
herself had been following Donna, but didnft know why she did not go 
into the street. (R. 332) She testified that Donna was about 25 feet 
ahead of her when she was running across the street and was passed the 
middle when the witness first saw the car that she thought was going 
to hit her, and that is why the witness stopped. As they approached 
the pedestrian lane, and prior to plaintiff's being hit, the witness 
saw no other car coming from the south. (R. 335) She saw no lights 
on the car that struck Donna, but she could not say there were no 
lights on it, (R. 338) On recrossexamination she corrected the 
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written statement she had previously given the counsel for the defend-
ant (Exhibit D-2) by testifying that since writing the statement she 
had learned that Billy Lee was not there, so she had been mistaken in her 
recollection. She was also mistaken in her statement in saying that 
Donna washed Billy's face, because Billy was not there. In her written 
statement she said that both boys started to chase us, but Brian was 
the only one there. (R. 340) She testified that the car carried the 
plaintiff a distance before she fell to the road. (R. 341) She 
described the distance between the edge of the crosswalk and where Donna 
was hit as 15 little steps, heel to toe. (It. 343) 
William Howes, husband of the defendant, testified that he 
called the Valley Fair Mall office after he was informed by his wife 
that she had been in an accident. (R. 347) He described the damage 
to the vehicle as follows: f!The hood --it has a curving front hood 
ori it and the front of the hood was pushed into the grill and the head-
light was broken on the right side." (R. 348, 349) Did not recall 
his wife telling the officer that she was driving 40 miles per hour. 
Did not hear her make any comment about her speed. (R. 350) 
Sheriff Jensen, called on rebuttal, testified that on the 
occasion of his investigation, the defendant never did say anything 
about another car with bright lights passing from the opposite direction 
just before impact, nor did she mention a car with bright lights to 
him at all. (R. 352) 
Dr. Robert Lee Youngblood, plastic surgeon, described plain-
tiff's injuries as follows: Multiple injuries, obviously healing 
lacerations or cuts, scrapes, bruises and some areas where skin had been 
torn away from her head, her left shoulder, her left arm, her right 
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hand, her left buttocks and both legs and feet. (R. 254) She would 
have some permanent scarring which was disfiguring. This was especially 
true of the left elbow and left ankle. The elbow scar probably would 
cause tenderness and irritation, and he recommended corrective plastic 
surgery for the elbow (R. 255) which surgery, requiring hospitalization, 
had been scheduled. (R. 257, 258) He further testified that the 
plaintiff had suffered a brain concussion. (R. 264) 
Dr. Gary F. Larsen, orthopedic surgeon, after describing 
plaintiff's injuries in some detail (R. 160, 161), stated that they 
were the kind of injuries that would be sustained by somebody being 
hit and then sliding along the pavement. (R. 162) He further testi-
fied that a concussion is a bruising of the brain with secondary swell-
ing and loss of consciousness and then amnesia for the event that caused 
the head injury and a little while before that and then for various 
periods or length of time after the injury, depending upon the severity 
of the concussion. Most neurosurgeons really define cerebral concussion 
as a loss of memory, both for the event and a little bit before the 
injury and afterwards. (R. 165) 
The foregoing medical summary of injuries is included in the 
Statement of Facts as it throws some light upon the nature of the 
accident, as well as furnishing a medical, explanation for plaintiff's 
inability to remember events following her entry into the crosswalk. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT 
WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
At the conclusion of the events, plaintiff asked the court in 
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her requested instruction #6 to instruct the jury that under the 
evidence presented in the case, the defendant was negligent as a matter 
of law. (R. 27) This request was denied. The evidence of all of the 
witnesses who testified at the trial, including the defendant herself, 
clearly and conclusively established negligence on the part of the 
defendant. The defendant admitted that she did not see the plaintiff 
until she hit her. The plaintiff had not just stepped off the curb 
into her path, but had traversed a minimum distance of 50 feet in 
arriving at the point where she was struck, and under the testimony of 
the two eye witnesses who saw the impact and the plaintiff's actions 
prior thereto, the plaintiff entered the crosswalk and remained in it 
until she reached the middle of the street, -he one witness placing 
her within a foot or two of the crosswalk when She was hit, and the 
defendant's witness placed her less than 15 ::eet from the crosswalk 
when hit (15 toe to heel measurements of the witnessfs feet). The 
intersection had the benefit of a street light. (Exhibit D-l) If 
defendant was in fact traveling at her claimed rate of speed of 25 miles 
per hour, certainly she had ample time to observe the plaintiff as she 
entered and proceeded in the pedestrian lane? had she been paying any 
reasonable attention to the road ahead of her. Indeed, the defendant 
was very familiar with the area, having traversed it twice each working 
day for approximately three years driving to and from work; and she 
knew of its residential character, and was under a duty to anticipate 
that children would be in the general area. There was nothing to 
obstruct her view. Even if the point of impact was at or near the 
mailbox, as defendant claimed, this would have placed the plaintiff 
in the street for a distance of 100 feet from the northeast corner of 
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the intersection where the plaintiff started to cross the street. 
It is true that the defendant claimed that her vision was 
affected by the car passing with bright lights, but on cross-examination 
she testified that they did not blind her sufficiently that she could 
not see the road in front of her, nor did they blind her sufficiently 
that she could not see objects in front of her that she normally would 
have been able to see. Furthermore, notwithstanding her claim of the 
approaching bright lights, she did not at any time decrease her speed 
prior to hitting the plaintiff. Counsel for the plaintiff realizes 
that the jurors are the exclusive judges: of the credibility of the 
witnesses, but we nevertheless feel inclined to suggest to the Court 
that the jury appeared not to have been disturbed by the incredibility 
of defendant's assertions that she looked at her speedometer and 
observed that she was going 25 miles per hour at a point 15 feet from 
the mailbox,where she said she struck the girl, that while she was 
traversing that 15 feet at 25 miles per hour, the car with bright 
lights passed, which she had observed further up the street, and - -
immediately after the car with bright lights passed, the plaintiff 
appeared directly in front of her vehicle. In the exercise of their 
function to pass on the credibility of the witnesses, they were not 
justified in establishing credibility by impossibility. How could any 
reasonable view of the evidence result in a finding that it preponder-
ated in favor of the defendant's freedom from negligence, when the 
defendant admitted that she did not see the plaintiff until she hit 
her, and the plaintiff was in her plain view for a period of several 
seconds, whether she was traversing the distance of over 100 feet, 
indicated by defendant's testimony, or of 50 feet as indicated by the 
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testimony of defendant's witness, Marilyn McCandless, and plaintiff's 
witness, Julie Lee? 
If the defendant was going 25 miles per hour as she approached 
the intersection, and continued at that speed without reduction of 
acceleration until impact, she would have had even more time and 
opportunity within which to adjust co the presence of the plaintiff 
running in the street than if she were going the 40 miles per hour 
which she admitted to the investigating officer. Furthermore, the 
defendant is not assisted by the claim that her view was impaired by 
the car passing with bright lights. She admitted that the lights did 
not prevent her from seeing the road in front of her, nor objects ahead 
of her that she would normally be able to see, and that the lights did 
not blind her sufficiently to encourage her to reduce her speed at any 
time before she struck the plaintiff. (R. ;J03) Even if, contrary to 
her own testimony, the defendant's ability t;o see the road ahead of 
her or other objects in the road was impaired because of the bright 
lights, then she was certainly under a duty to reduce her speed of 25 
miles per hour as long as the interference with her view existed or was 
threatened. She saw this car with its lights approaching from a con-
siderable distance ahead, and was unable to testify that they were high 
beam rather than low beam lights. 
The defendant was negligent in failure to yield right of way 
under any reasonable view that could be taken of the evidence. It is 
undisputed in the evidence that plaintiff was in the crosswalk until 
she reached the center of the street. The defendant should have seen 
her in the exercise of ordinary care, and should have at least started 
to yield the right of way to her even before she arrived at the middle 
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of the street. If she did not want to yield the right of way, she 
should have at least decreased her speed, whatever it was, applied 
brakes, or taken some evasive action,in the exercise of ordinary care, 
to avoid injuring the plaintiff, Realizing that the defendant struck 
the plaintiff with her right front headlight and fender near the right 
edge of the traveled portion of the highway, any decrease of speed or 
other evasive action would have prevented the injury of the plaintiff. 
Plaintiff respectfully refers to the case of Larson v. Evans» 
12 Utah 2d 245, 364 P.2d 1088 decided October 3, 1961. That was a 
case for personal injuries arising out of an automobile accident. The 
trial court instructed the jury that the defendant was negligent as a 
matter of law because of his admitted failure to stop for the stop 
sign, and the question of plaintiff's contributory negligence was sub-
mitted to the jury in interrogatory form for their determination as 
to whether plaintiff (a) failed to keep a proper lookout, (b) did not 
have his car under control, or (c) was driving too fast for existing 
conditions. The jurors answered the interrogatories in the affirmative 
and further found that the plaintiff's negligence was the proximate 
cause of the accident. The jury were directed by the court to return 
a verdict against the plaintiff, no cause of action, and plaintiff's 
motion for new trial was denied. In reviewing the evidence, this 
court held that the plaintiff in that action was not guilty of con-
tributory negligence, despite the jury's finding to the contrary, in 
any of the three respects covered by the interrogatories, and in so 
ruling this court also repudiated the action of the trial court in 
denying the motion for new trial. 
In the case at bar, the evidence most favorable to the 
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defendant shows that the defendant, having ample opportunity to do so, 
failed to see the plaintiff until she hit her. The undisputed evidence 
presented by both parties conclusively shows that the plaintiff < 
entered the crosswalk and remained in it until she arrived at the 
middle of the street, and that she was struck within 15 feet of the 
crosswalk. The defendant, whose testimony was otherwise incredible, 
claimed that she was driving 25 miles per hour and not the 40 miles 
per hour that was admitted to the sheriff during his investigation; 
but the slower the defendant was traveling, the more opportunity she 
had to observe the plaintiff and take measures to avoid striking her 
before arriving at the point of impact. Notwithstanding all of this 
showing, the jury found that the negligence of the crosswalk-traveling 
plaintiff was the proximate cause of her injuries, and this finding 
was made in the face of the fact that any split second delay in defend-
ant's arrival at the point of impact would have prevented the collision, 
as previously discussed in this brief. We respectfully submit that 
in this case, as in the Larson case, this court, under the evidence 
in the furtherance of justice, should repudiate the action of the jury 
and the trial court by granting plaintiff a new trial with the issue 
of defendant's negligence being declared as a matter of law and re-
moved from jury consideration. 
See also Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 850; 366 P.2d 701. 
In the case of Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 2d 435; 326 P.2d 722, 
this court repudiated the verdict of the jury absolving the defendant 
of negligence, holding that the evidence was ample to support a verdict 
for the child and insufficient to justify the verdict of no cause of 
action. In that case the child was struck about four and one-half 
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feet after entering the street, and the defendant was traveling at a 
speed of 25 miles per hour with his headlights on. In the case at bar 
the plaintiff child was within a few inches from completing the cross-
ing of the street when she was struck by the defendant, and the 
defendant had much more time within which to observe her position in 
the street and decrease her speed, -. v-i: 
- .: ^ •;„:• POINT II 
THE TRIM. COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFF fS REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION #8.
 : ., , ; b ; ^ - K b v 
; This instruction was to the effect that the defendant was 
lender a duty, while operating a motor vehicle in a residential area, 
to exercise reasonable care to observe the presence of children or 
other persons who may be reasonably expected to be on or near the 
street upon which defendant's vehicle was being operated. The accident 
did, in fact, occur in a residential area. The defendant was very 
familiar with its residential character, having traversed the area 
twice a day to and froxn work for a period of approximately three years. 
No other instruction was given by the court covering the subject 
matter of the denied request. . . . , * < ,.,.',•,-..-
-;•-:....-,,, -:,., : ; POINT III -';, --•/-' :,: —; : -IM . 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
..;••;••< ,, It was the manifest duty of the trial judge to have granted 
plaintiff's motion for a new trial, having committed error in refusing 
plaintiff's request to charge the jury that the defendant was negli-
gent as a matter of law, and having refused to instruct the jury with 
respect to the residential character of the location of the accident 
as it affected defendant's duty to exercise ordinary care in the ^ 
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operation of her vehicle. The motion for new trial was based on two 
grounds: (1) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or 
other decision or that it is against law, and (2) error in law. It is 
clear that the jury completely ignored the court's instructions on duty 
to maintain lookout, failure to yielc. right of way, and all of the 
instructions relating to the preponderance of the evidence in finding 
that the defendant was not negligent, notwithstanding all of the 
evidence presented to them as summarized in the Statement of Facts, 
and this finding of the jury was shockingly insupportable considering 
the defendant's admission of not seeing the plaintiff until she hit 
her, when the plaintiff was in her plain view for a period of several 
seconds, and when any decrease of speed or evasive action on defendant's 
part would have prevented the injury. The trial court's failure to 
grant a new trial in this case was not just an abuse of discretion. 
It was a failure on the part of the trial court to exercise its respon-
sibility to preside over a trial dedicated to the proposition that 
justice is more important than a blind veneration for unreasonable 
jury action. The jury had the duty of discovering the ultimate truth 
and of finding the factual issues, but they also had the duty to follow 
the instructions of the court with respect to the law applicable to 
the case, and particularly the instructions with respect to the pre-
ponderance of the evidence and the duties of the parties to the lawsuit. 
It is apparent that the jury disregarded altogether the 
testimony of the two girls who placed the plaintiff in the crosswalk 
until she arrived at the middle of the street, and one of these 
witnesses was a witness testifying on behalf of the defendant. How 
could any of the jurors have reasonably held that the defendant should 
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not have seen the plaintiff as she approached the intersection in time 
to decrease her speed, whatever it was, by taking her foot off the 
accelerator, applying her brakes, or taking some evasive action in the 
exercise of reasonable care to avoid injuring the plaintiff, realizing 
that any split second delay in the arrival of defendant's vehicle at 
the point where the impact occurred would have prevented it? 
Justice Crockett, speaking for this court in Hyland v. St. 
Mark's Hospital, 19 Utah 2d 134; 427 P.2d 736 at page 137 of the Utah 
Reports, stated: .
 >;. .-.• •'"••"' 
"We have indeed frequently affirmed the importance 
of trial by jury. However, it must be realised that 
even a jury is not: so sacrosanct as to be beyond the 
possibility of error. Like other aspects of authority 
in our system of government under law, it is essential 
that there be some check against arbitrariness, abuse 
>>.....,..-. or mistake. The safeguard against this is the 
authority of the trial judge who has supervisory 
control over the proceedings and is charged with the 
ultimate responsibility of seeing that justice is 
.done. To accomplish that purpose it is essential 
that his power to grant or deny motions for nex? 
trial be recognized. This is necessarily something 
more than simply to rule as a matter of law that the 
evidence w^ll or vOU! not support a verdict. The 
latter would only allow him to judge whether the 
verdict should be sustained as a matter of law, and 
would not permit £.ny latitude of discretion. 
"Consistent with the purpose just discussed, whenever 
what has transpired in the proceeding is so offensive 
to the trial court's sense of justice that he believes 
the desired objective of affording the parties a fair 
trial has failed, he has both the prerogative and the 
f duty to grant a new trial. This court has always 
recognized that the trial court has a broad dis-
cretion in doing so, and that his ruling thereon should 
not be overturned unless it appears that his action was 
arbitrary, or that it clearly transgressed any reason-
able bounds of discretion." 
If under any set of facts the trial judge has not only the 
prerogative but the duty to grant a new trial, this court, in the 
-25-
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exercise of its appellate supervision of the trial court, also has a 
duty to determine whether there was some sound basis for the trial 
court's discretion, or whether the trial judge's duty was violated in 
granting or denying the motion. Ultimately the prerogative and.the 
duty rests upon this court to follow its conscience and the law in 
determining whether the trial judge abused his discretion, if he had 
any, and violated his duty, if such violation is reasonably clear. 
CONCLUSION 
The court, having failed to instruct the jury that the 
defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law, and the jury 
having rendered a verdict which was not supported by the evidence but 
was directly against it, it became the clear duty of the trial court 
to grant the plaintiff's motion for a new trial, and thus repudiate, 
rather than endorse, the shocking miscarriage of justice which had 
occurred. We respectfully urge this court, in the furtherance of 
justice and right, to reverse the judgment of the court below, and 
grant to plaintiff a new trial, with the direction that defendant be 
adjudged negligent as a matter of law. 
Respectfully submitted. 
WOOBROW D. WHITE 
2121 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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